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Introduction  
The rights of animals are not typically a concern for most people. Animals have lived 
amongst human-beings as long as we can remember, sharing living space and communities and 
changing each otherǯs lives for better or worse. The interest for animal rights has strongly 
developed in the last few centuries, with more people arguing that we should take animals and 
their interests into account. They are not merely means to an end, but they are living beings, 
with an interest to live a life worth living. This development can be seen in, for example, the rise 
of political parties that have animal rights and environmental issues as their main objective. In 
Europe, the rise of political animal parties has been apparent, with right now around 10 parties 
in different countries who are vouching for the importance of animal justice.1 Even more 
movements are being introduced, like the Animal Euro 7. This is the coalition of 7 of the before 
mentioned parties, who are together trying to win seats in the European Parliament to fight 
against speciesism and for more animal rights throughout Europe.2 Apart from political parties, 
there are numerous non-governmental organizations that make an effort for animals. One of the 
most important ones is PETA, the largest animal rights organization in the world. It is safe to say 
that people are increasingly more concerned with animal rights. But still, there is a lot of work to 
do. 
The increasing world population and the demand of meat have greatly worsened the 
conditions of animals in the meat industry. The amount of animal abuse has made it necessary 
for organizations to step in and demand more care for the animals. These conditions include 
situations like experiments on animals, where the animal is used to test products on that will be 
used for humans. They are frequently brought into contact with large amounts of chemical 
products, dripped in their eyes or injected into their bloodstream. A lot of the animals do not 
survive, and there is also a large number of animals who have never been used, but are killed 
because there are too many of them.3 Under the right circumstances and with substantial 
funding, these experiments could be lessened.4 Animal rights organizations thus try to convince 
companies to look for other ways of testing that does not include animals.  
                                                          
1
 http://www.esdaw-eu.eu/animal-welfare-parties-in-europe.html  
2
 http://worldanimal.net/world-animal-net-blog/item/363-animal-politics-the-rise-of-animal-advocacy-parties  
3
 Information about animal testing can be found on the website of PETA, here: 
http://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-for-experimentation/animal-testing-101/ . A page of the Dutch 
government about the surplus of animals that are killed in certain years can be found here: 
http://www.nkca.nl/dierproeven/feiten-en-cijfers/zorg-voor-proefdieren/overtollige-en-ongeschikte-dieren/ . 
It says that for example in 2012, 524.735 animals were killed before they were even tested upon. This occurs 
for different reasons, such as that they are too old or their genotype is not right. For comparison: in that year 
there have been 589.056 tests on animals. The amount of animals that has been killed without testing is thus 
almost half of the animals that are meant to be tested upon. 
4
 See, for example, this book: Jukes and Chiuia, From Guinea Pig to Computer Mouse. 
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There are many more reasons that organizations and political parties have begun to stick up 
for animal rights. Think about fur that is used for human clothing, shooting wild animals, the 
increasing number of endangered species due to different reasons (including global warming), 
and animals used for entertainment. All over the world, animal rights and interests are not 
considered for different reasons and with different objectives, most of them beneficial for 
humans. Due to overpopulation, tourism, overconsumption, and technical advancements, the 
abuse of animals has become much more frequent and differentiated. Hence, it is not a 
coincidence that the concern for animals has risen the last few decades. People become 
vegetarian or vegan or try to contribute to animal welfare in other ways. It seems that the use of 
animals has gone far beyond intentions necessary for survival, and for this reason increasingly 
more people advocate in the name of animals.  
Still, a large part of the world is not convinced by these developments and maintain that 
using animals is justified. They would argue that people have always been meat-eaters, for 
example. Another frequently used argument is that animals kill each other in the wild too. Why 
would we be concerned with animal welfare, when animals amongst each other are not? Why 
would it be bad to use animals for human goods, when they clearly use each other too?  
Multiple scholars have come up with theories about this subject, ranging from animal 
welfarist accounts to critics who deny the possibility of animal rights. Peter Singer is one of the 
most important philosophers in the animal rights realm. Singer is a utilitarian, drawing on the 
theory of Jeremy Bentham.5 He and Bentham agree about the basis which must be used to 
criticize what we should take into account when we want to decide about principles of justice. 
This is for them suffering. According to Singer, what makes it an obligation for us to consider 
animals in our principles of justice is the fact that they can suffer. Thus, he is primarily 
concerned with sentients. Singer argues that the fact that we are willing to use animals as mere 
means to an end, for example when we eat them or experiment on them, is discrimination. When 
we recognize that animals can suffer, we cannot just ignore the suffering we cause when we use 
them for our own, as we would not do that with any human-being. Moreover, when we admit 
that animals are capable in preferring some life above another, we must take that into account 
and be sure that their interests are being preserved. Singer is mainly concerned with suffering 
and he attacks concepts like dignity, which he thinks are flawed and point to speciesism. 
Tom Regan is another philosopher who is concerned with animal rights.6 He too is a 
utilitarian, and is compelled by utilitarianism by its egalitarian approach; everyoneǯs interests 
are weighed in deciding which outcome is best, and every interest is weighed in equally, such 
                                                          
5
 LaFollette, Ethics in Practice. P. 174-179. 
6
 Sadly, during the development of my thesis, Tom Regan passed away. I greatly admire his work and thank him 
for the valuable contributions he has made to the field of animal rights. 
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that no one is more important than another. For Regan, this means that animal interests must be 
considered too. Animals, like humans, have inherent value, independent from any other living 
being, and we must respect that inherent value and treat animals accordingly. This inherent 
value comes from the fact that we are all ǲexperiencing subjects of lifeǳ.7 Thus, Regan argues that 
everyone who is a living being must be treated with some kind of respect and consideration to 
their values. 
There are many more theories about animal rights, and I will elaborate about some of them 
further in my paper. The point here is that the transition from a developing world in which 
animals are mistreated to upcoming theories about animal rights in philosophy is a logical one 
that should not be underestimated. Not only scholars concern themselves with the fate of 
animals. In my paper, I will defend that such a concern is a logical one, and we should expand the 
realm of justice to include animals as well. 
We should aim at a theory that can provide a solid and, hopefully, also intuitive sound 
groundwork for considering animals in principles of justice. Although these above mentioned 
theories are of great importance, I will argue that there is one theory that appeals to the task at 
hand and that is the Capabilities Approach of Martha Nussbaum. Her theory states that we 
should aim at preserving dignity for all living beings. We should do this by identifying the 
capabilities they have that enable them to lead a flourishing life, and trying to protect these 
capabilities. Her theory makes a strong argument especially for marginal cases, meaning people 
who lack certain traits that normally are used as a basis to value human beings. For example, one 
of the cases she uses is mentally disabled people, who are human-beings but can lack rationality. 
Rationality is a basis for a lot of theories that value humans above, for example, animals. She 
then uses the same Capabilities Approach, which defends human dignity on other grounds, to 
make a case for animal rights. In her account, animals have inherent value because they have 
capabilities that can make their life valuable. We should respect these capabilities and aim at not 
obstructing them. 
I will argue for this theory and show that it is the best one we have for arguing for animal 
justice. I will do this by first considering what the Capabilities Approach has been to this point, 
contrasting it with other theories. In this first part, I will show that the Capabilities Approach has 
a large advantage in comparison with the other theories I just mentioned. The Capabilities 
Approach can look beyond standard presuppositions about the species that one belongs to, or 
race, or gender, etcetera. It rather aims to look at the individual and the capabilities and needs it 
has. It has the advantage over a utilitarian doctrine because it does not look at outcomes or 
allows aggregating results. It will become obvious, throughout my thesis, that justice is not only 
                                                          
7
 LaFollette, Ethics in Practice. P. 210. 
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served when people and animals have the same opportunity for goods, but also when they have 
the same opportunity to enable their capabilities.  
This connection between capabilities and rights will be strengthened by the recognition 
theory of Paul Ricoeur in Chapter Two of my thesis. There I will show that the reasons that 
people desire justice is the same as why animals should be partakers. Ricoeurǯs theory 
contributes to my thesis the necessary relation between capabilities and rights. He shows that 
the recognition of functioning we have in ourselves, leads to the same recognition in others. 
When we acknowledge the importance of our own and otherǯs capabilities and the necessity for 
functioning to be a thriving individual, we will concede that justice has to be aimed towards 
defending these capabilities.  
In the other two parts of Chapter Two, I will develop and defend my theory and how it will 
contribute to society. In order not to conflate the questions of who receives justice and who 
frames justice, we need to answer to not only human, but also animal capabilities. First, we 
should broaden the scope of existing rights to all beings inhabiting distinctive capabilities 
corresponding to those rights. Furthermore, we have to rely on science to tell us about animal 
capabilities, and incorporate the capabilities in our justice system. In the last part of the body of 
my thesis, I will explore some implications, and claim that the Applied Capabilities Approach is 
not meant to grant animals citizenship. 
My goal for this thesis is not to presume or develop a moral theory. Rather, I would like to 
propose the Capabilities Approach as a theory of rights that needs to be used as a safeguard for 
justice. Note that my aim is not to defend that animals are moral beings themselves, who can act 
good or bad, just or unjust. My claim is that we have as much reason to defend animals as well as 
humans. My mission will be to convince the reader of the two following notions: first, 
capabilities in themselves are valuable, because they promote the flourishing of beings. They 
must be protected because without capabilities, animals – human or non-human – cannot live a 
dignified life worth living.. Secondly, capabilities are the best foundation of rights, because they 
are the only legitimate basis that can support a claim for a right. Capabilities, in short, are the 
means as well as the end of a theory of justice.  
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Chapter One: The Journey of the Capabilities Approach  
 
As I have said, most scholars who defend animal rights draw upon some kind of similarity 
between humans and animals, which defeats a non-inclusive argument. This seems the most 
compelling strategy; because, if we can prove that the argument that people use to exclude 
animals will lead to certain humans to be excluded too, that argument is not solid. I have 
mentioned the main examples in my introduction, and I will mention some more in the parts 
that have yet to come. For now, consider first this: why do we have to look for resemblance of 
human in animals? Why is that necessary to make a valid argument against the abuse of 
animals? In using this tactic, do we not just strengthen our anthropocentric world-view? 
I have struggled with this question in the beginning of my search to the best way to tackle 
the problem of animal ethics. What bugs me the most is that I think we should be able to move 
past our conception that only what we, humans, can perceive, is valuable. There is proof all over 
that some animals are in certain ways much more intelligent than we are. Darwin, as the leader 
in findings about animal social behavior, sees this in monkeys that pick each otherǯs fur and in 
pack-hunting.1 People would need endless amounts of planning and communication to reach the 
level of effective hunting that animals have reached. Intelligence and language proves to not 
always be the significant factor in successful cooperation. Social behavior can take place in 
different species, in different ways. So why do we have to break every single animal down in 
human terms of achievement? How are their ways of being less meaningful than ours? 
I think the best way of reaching a somewhat acceptable conclusion is to find a way in which 
we do not exclude animals because they are less, but define everyone as what they are in 
comparison with each other, namely, different. Each species of animals differs in needs, ways to 
flourish, capacities, and all other relevant qualities that have to be taken into account while 
sorting out our behavior towards them. And even inside species, where individuals also vary in 
these aspects, we should be wary about generalizations. Humans are just one species in a whole 
web of diverse creatures, and we cannot possibly hold that only where other animals resemble 
us, they can be significant. 
Thus, looking for a theory that treats everyone in accordance with their individual qualities, 
I found the convincing case of the Capabilities Approach.   
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Regan and Singer, Animal Rights and Human Obligations. p. 78. 
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Nussbaum’s criticism of other scholars  
My main argument will draw upon the work of Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum defended her 
Capabilities Approach in her book ǮFrontiers of Justiceǯ.2 She uses the contractarian approach of 
Rawls as a starting point for her theory, criticizing as well as developing it.3 Nussbaum is very 
critical about contemporary theories about justice and morality which, for the bigger part, only 
think of the decision-making citizens as able men who make a contract with each other. 
Nussbaum points to three groups that are systematically excluded from the ǲdemosǳ: people 
who are disabled in some way or another, non-citizens and non-human animals.4 The biggest 
problem is that, in deciding upon the norms and values that will shape society, only people who 
are able to take part in the decision-making process will be able to shape the social contract. The 
basis of a contractarian approach is that people join in a society as people would join in a 
relation with each other by signing a contract.5 When put this way, people or animals who are 
not able to ǲsignǳ such a contract are not considered valuable partners in making up society, and 
thus, are ignored by these theories. Nussbaum argues that this is wrongly exclusive to the before 
mentioned groups. The questions ǲWho make the contract?ǳ and ǲFor whom is the contract 
made?ǳ are being conflated in the process.6 According to Nussbaum, we have to look at a 
different way to shape our moral convictions, thus, the Capabilities Approach. 
In this paper, I will of course be concerned with the argument Nussbaum uses for how 
we should treat non-human animals and their rights. This is not to say that I do not value the 
rest of Nussbaumǯs theory for disabled people and non-citizens. I do agree with a lot that she has 
to say on those two topics, but as long as they do not serve a purpose for my current research, I 
will not discuss these parts any further. 
Continuing my argument, I will have a closer examination of why Nussbaum thinks non-
human animals are not being treated as they should by contractarian approaches. A lot of 
theorists declare that we do not have any direct moral duties to animals, or they argue that we 
only have indirect moral duties.7 In the starting chapter of her book, Nussbaum makes some 
basic presumptions about how theories of justice and cooperation are shaped. One of the 
presumptions she mentions is that people are viewed to be ǲfree, equal and independentǳ. 
Scholars often use an account about the individuality as well as the equality of people, explaining 
why they would cooperate and make a social contract amongst them.8 People who find 
themselves in a state wherein the best course of action would be cooperation, would be willing 
                                                          
2
 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice. 
3
 Ibid. p. 69. 
4
 Ibid. p. 14-22. 
5
 Ibid. p. 10. 
6
 Ibid. p. 21. 
7
 Ibid. p. 21-24. 
8
 Ibid. p. 28-34. 
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to use a social contract to make some rules in order to defend themselves and their resources. 
Nussbaum points out that such an account about the basic strength and power, physical and 
mental, is problematic for the problems she just described. These theories cannot, and maybe 
were not interested in, solve the problems concerning how we should deal with animals, human 
and non-human, who lack these equal strengths. As for independence and freedom, Nussbaum 
sees similar issues; her problematic cases are a reflection of people who are not by rule free and 
independent. The theories of Locke, Rousseau, Rawls and the other scholars she mentioned, are 
not equipped to clarify how these beings could be treated as part of the state. Her aim now is not 
to abolish these theories completely. Nussbaum argues that they have great fundamental value 
and we should not forget nor underestimate the contributions they have made to the 
understanding about justice. Rather, she would like to make a contribution to the three 
problematic fields she has encountered, and develop both theories until they end in similar 
assumptions. Then, she believes, ǲwe are on the right trackǳ.9 
Nussbaum is also critical of Utilitarianism. According to her, a utility approach is not 
seriously considered with each person individually, thus treating some as a means to an end.10 
What utilitarianism does wrong, like certain other approaches that try to measure human 
development, is that it aggregates results. This means that everything is measured against each 
other, whereas Nussbaum rightly states that certain things should not be weighed out against 
each other, like health against wealth. Utilitarianism is also only concerned with status quo 
preferences. It does not try to look at social constructs that may be the reason that some people 
want certain things.11 As a final note, Nussbaum claims that utilitarianism has a blind eye for 
everything else that matters except feelings of satisfaction. She gives the famous example that 
Nozick proposed with the ǲExperience Machineǳ; a feeling of satisfaction can be artificially given, 
but the striving and actual active participation for something is valuable too. Utilitarianism does 
not regard this in aggregating the social good. 
As I have noted before, Nussbaum points to the fact that in contemporary theories, a lot of 
our duties towards animals are still human-based. This is because theorists do not see 
nonhuman animals as valuable in themselves; they only have value in so far as that is placed 
upon them by humans. This is founded, says Nussbaum, in the Jewish and Christian tradition 
that human-beings were given sole authority over the world of nature.12 The Aristotelian 
tradition tells a different story. All living creatures should be respected. Nussbaum holds that 
her account has an important Aristotelian ground which makes it very compatible with animal 
                                                          
9
 Ibid. p. 69. 
10
 Ibid. p. 72-73. 
11
 Nussbaum says, for example, that women or other marginalized groups sometimes adjust their preferences 
and wants to what they think is actually achievable for them. 
12
 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice. p. 328. 
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dignity. This is lacking in the contractarian approaches. With Kant, animals are excluded from 
the realm of justice because they lack self-consciousness. We should only treat animals kindly 
because this enforces our kind behavior towards humans.13 Similarly, Rawls believes that we 
owe duties of justice to people who can form a conception of the good and have a capacity for 
justice. These capacities are not inhabited by all animals, which will exclude them from 
principles of justice. To Nussbaum, this is not acceptable. 
 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach 
As an alternative to the social contract theories, that have proved to be weak defenders of 
the problematic cases, Nussbaum presents her ǲCapabilities Approachǳ. She uses her theory to 
argue for certain basic human values that should be respected worldwide, as respect for basic 
human dignity. These capabilities are basic human strengths, that is, what human beings can do 
when they live a life that is worth living, according to human dignity. She makes a list of the basic 
capabilities humans have and argues that these are the ones that should be respected by the 
political realm. When focusing on these capabilities, one can rise above the underlying 
differences that people have about which lives are valuable to live, and make the capacities of 
humans the object of decision-making. Also, Nussbaum holds that this theory will treat everyone 
as an end, independent of othersǯ goals or issues. Lastly, she will show that there is a threshold of 
the capabilities under which ǲ…truly human functioning is not possibleǳ.14 
Nussbaum uses the human capabilities as a benchmark for what is required for people to 
live a life of human dignity. With her principles in mind, one can see if societies have secured a 
good standard of living for its citizens. Each society must defend these capabilities as general 
goals, but can specify some more according to the individual principles this society holds. What 
is not allowed is the promoting of some, while ignoring others. Nussbaum holds that this does 
not pay enough respect to these human capacities, and the human dignity that follows from 
them. Nussbaum is critical of her own account, acknowledging that it cannot deal with 
inequalities that fall above the basic threshold for every capability, and that there may be 
important other values that can be added to the list. It can be revisited and modified over time. 
For now, the list she provides us with is the following:15 
 
1. Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length; not dying 
prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to be not worth living.  
2. Bodily Health. Being able to have good health, including reproductive health; to be 
adequately nourished; to have adequate shelter.  
                                                          
13
 Ibid. p. 329. 
14
 Ibid. p. 71. 
15
 Ibid. P. 76-78. The lengthy quotation was needed to properly explain and refer to the theory. 
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3. Bodily Integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; to be secure against 
violent assault, including sexual assault and domestic violence; having opportunities for 
sexual satisfaction and for choice in matters of reproduction.  
4. Senses, Imagination, and Thought. Being able to use the senses, to imagine, think, 
and reason-and to do these things in a "truly human" way, a way informed and cultivated 
by an adequate education, including, but by no means limited to, literacy and basic 
mathematical and scientific training. Being able to use imagination and thought in 
connection with experiencing and producing works and events of one's own choice, 
religious, literary, musical, and so forth. Being able to use one's mind in ways protected 
by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech 
and freedom of religious exercise. Being able to have pleasurable experiences and to 
avoid nonbeneficial pain.  
5. Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and people outside ourselves; to 
love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their absence; in general, to love, to 
grieve, to experience longing, gratitude, and justified anger. Not having one's emotional 
development blighted by fear and anxiety.  
6. Practical Reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one's life. (This entails protection for the liberty of 
conscience and religious observance.)  
7. Affiliation.  
A. Being able to live with and toward others, to recognize and show concern for other 
human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be able to imagine the 
situation of another. (Protecting this capability means protecting institutions that 
constitute and nourish such forms of affiliation, and also protecting the freedom of 
assembly and political speech.)  
B. Having the social bases of self-respect and nonhumiliation; being able to be treated as a 
dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others. This entails provisions of 
nondiscrimination on the basis of race, sex, sexual orientation, ethnicity, caste, religion, 
national origin.  
8. Other Species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, 
and the world of nature.  
9. Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.  
10. Control over One's Environment.  
A. Political. Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life, 
having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.  
B. Material. Being able to hold property (both land and movable goods), and having 
property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an 
equal basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In 
work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reasoning and entering 
into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers. 
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These capabilities are deliberately phrased in a general way. This leaves the room for 
societies to decide how they will interpret them. Nussbaum wants the capabilities to be used as a 
freestanding, partial moral conception. This means that the list is to be used as a political guide, 
for people who overall may have different morals. Furthermore, every citizen must be able to 
decide whether they want to make use of the capabilities; the option is protected, but should not 
be obligatory.  
The basic list Nussbaum provides is for the bigger part a theory about humans, and animals 
do not yet seem to fit the picture. In the last part of the first chapter, she explains how this 
approach can help us to find a way in which one can value nonhuman animals.16 Because not 
only rationality but also other virtues are considered, an argument about why we should take 
animal capabilities in regard is fairly easy. If we claim that these capabilities bring about a form 
of a human dignified life, so can we say that animals should be able to act according to their 
capabilities and lead their life as dignified beings. It is also very sensible of differences between 
animals; this theory is not only for sentient beings, but can judge every animal differently. 
Political debate should be stimulated by these capacities, asking which we should protect to 
ensure a dignified animal life. It is certainly not an easy approach, but it is showing some great 
advantages in respect to a contractarian approach. In the deliberating view of the contractarian 
theories, there is no room for developing an account for nonhuman animals. 
 
In contrasting Utilitarianism with her view, Nussbaum points to the fact that her account, as 
well as the utilitarian doctrine, is an outcome-based theory. This means that the procedure is not 
what is important in developing issues of justice, but the results are. This is very important, 
because the contractarian approach has such a big problem with the fact that it conflates the 
questions ǲWho frames the principles of Justice?ǳ with ǲFor whom are the principles framed?ǳ It 
has to come up with some argument for why beings who cannot participate in the making of the 
contract are still to be considered. Her Capabilities Approach, as well as Utilitarianism, has no 
problem in that regard. What makes her theory to be preferred over Utilitarianism are some 
basic assumptions Utilitarianism makes that are problematic when considered in relation to 
animals. The consequentialist component, which argues that the best outcome is the one that 
overall brings the most good consequences, has its downfalls because it holds that there is such 
a conception of the good that it can be applied generally. In Nussbaumǯs theory, only dignity and 
the according capabilities should be counted as general goals. It leaves enough room for societies 
to define these principles in ways according to their further values. The overall good is not to be 
                                                          
16
 Ibid. p. 93-94. 
Nussďauŵ͛s Capaďilities Approach and Animal Rights 
 
13 
 
preferred over the individual good, because that disregards the capability to have practical 
reason and to have control over oneǯs own environment.  
Nussbaum further argues that the theories of Singer and Bentham, wanting to maximize 
pleasure or preferences, are flawed in the way that they too try to aggregate everything into one 
single feeling that needs to be maximized.17 Some principles cannot be compensated for by large 
amounts of another. Furthermore, there are also needs and pursues that cannot be aggregated to 
a feeling of pleasure or frustration. These needs have value and need to be considered, like free 
movement and physical achievement. Finally, Utilitarians have a ǲnumbers problemǳ; so long as 
a life has a small amount of utility, for a utilitarian it is worth bringing more life into existence. 
This is certainly a problem when it comes to animals. Considering the meat industry, Utilitarians 
cannot make a substantive argument against the breeding of more animals. Thus, Nussbaum 
concludes, Utilitarianism has great merits, but also has its defects when trying to defend animal 
rights. 
There are a number of Utilitarians who are more concerned with these problems and have 
incorporated another version of Utilitarianism. One of these is Derek Parfit. Parfit believes that 
we should not narrow ourselves to straightforward Utilitarian terms like happiness and 
suffering. Quality can be added to a life in other ways, like health or education.18 Parfit develops 
a view that he calls Prioritarian. This view entails wanting to benefit the people who would gain 
more from it, but it also prioritizes the people who need the benefit the most.19 In this way, we 
would favor people who are worse off instead of people who would benefit more, but are 
already better off. Benefiting the worst-off is better because it increases the value the benefit 
has, making the utility greater, but it also produces more equality. According to Parfit, this 
theory has a built-in bias towards equality, but is not in fact egalitarian.20 Another example of an 
author that has developed a different form of utilitarianism is R. M. Hare. Hare has developed a 
theory where we should think about the preferences we have, and we should decide according 
to two levels of thinking: critical and intuitive.21 He asserts that with a critical and intuitive 
component, utilitarianism is more able to deal with the obvious replies, such as the experience 
machine. An intuitive question would be replied with an intuitive utilitarian answer, and vice 
versa. Also, preferences will be construed with a better understanding of which situation 
someone prefers, instead of only the emotive outcome.22 
                                                          
17
 Ibid. p. 344-345. 
18
 Paƌfit, ͞EƋualitǇ aŶd PƌioƌitǇ.͟ p. 83. 
19
 Ibid. p. 101. 
20
 Ibid. p. 106. 
21
 Hare and Hare, Moral Thinking. p. 45-46. 
22
 Ibid. p. 143. 
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Some of Nussbaumǯs objections would be defeated by this view. Parfit asserts that his 
theory can avoid the Levelling Down objection that challenges equality.23 Parfit also seems to 
tackle the objection that Utilitarians are solely outcome-based, because his theory is concerned 
with equality as well as utility. Similarly, Hare defeats this objection by placing some value on 
the method that is used in the way of thinking. But still, utilitarianism is insufficient when it 
comes to defending animal rights.. The theory does nothing with the distinction between  
animals and humans – it does not take into account the difference between how easy it is to 
measure utility with humans and how difficult it is to measure with animals. We would need an 
arguably complicated system to establish the impacts that every decision has on an animal, and 
relate that to everyone involved, including humans. Moreover, for a rights theory, utilitarianism 
has only one basis to build on, which is utility. I would argue there is more that has to be 
incorporated in a justice system; utilities are blind for situations people or animals are in, and 
presuppose an ability to prefer. Not every being will be able to actively enjoy something, but that 
does not mean its capabilities and rights must be ignored. 
 
Dignity and individuality 
Nussbaum begins her theory of the Capabilities Approach with a conception of human 
dignity. But, she argues, this dignity can also be extended to animals.24 It is the respect for a form 
of life, which should be able to flourish and live a life worth living. This respect follows from the 
kinds of things this form of life is able to do. Once we respect the way in which its natural powers 
drive the being, we should respect the being in itself. Nussbaum draws upon Aristotle, who told 
his pupils that they should wonder about every kind of animal, for human-beings are no 
different from animals. If you wonder about and respect humans, you should do the same for 
animals. Once you are convinced that what makes humans flourish should be protected, you 
have to adopt the same kind of argument for the same kinds of reasons to animals. 
When trying to extend the notion of social cooperation to the realm of animals, Nussbaum 
claims that we should not make up some kind of conception of the ǲgood of animal livesǳ.25 
Instead, we should look at the diversity of animals and respect them individually. Just like with 
humans, we do not want to prescribe some form of living well. We want to try to come up with 
some basic principles that we should endorse to protect the animalǯs dignity, while making sure 
we do not impose some way of living on them that disrespects this dignity. Nussbaum will use 
theory and imagination to try and reach an understanding of the functioning of animals, as she 
                                                          
23
 The Levelling Down Objection contains that, whenever only equality is important, this would mean we would 
make people worse off when we cannot make them better off because that serves equality. This, according to 
Parfit, is an unhappy result which should be avoided. 
24
 Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice. p. 346-348. 
25
 Ibid. p. 352. 
Nussďauŵ͛s Capaďilities Approach and Animal Rights 
 
15 
 
argues that both will prove useful, and imagining in particular is crucial to the understanding of 
animals.26 
Thus, Nussbaumǯs theory is concerned with individual animals. She clearly states that her 
theory does not, for example, have an answer for the continuation of species.27 She says that if 
she is right about why animals need justice, it is because they suffer individually and we have to 
protect them individually to ensure that they make use of their capacities. It is irrelevant what 
species the animal belongs to; what matters are individual capacities. But, how does that work? 
Because different animals, even from the same species, can have different capabilities. How do 
we evaluate an animalǯs capability? Singer, for example, depends on sentience; Regan depends 
on an intrinsic value of animals who have reached the age of one year. Nussbaum tells us that we 
can only harm an animal in taking away something he had before. This means that, for example, 
denying the right to drive a car to a rabbit is useless. This is in line with the Capabilities 
Approach; harming should be judged by what capabilities an animal has. In addition, Nussbaum 
explains that an animal must have one of the capabilities she mentioned, for it to have a moral 
stance. It is thus not necessary to have all of the capabilities. Another question she answers is if 
species membership matters for the evaluation of the individual. Nussbaum thinks the 
Capabilities Approach is likely to say yes, because it seems to place a lot of value upon 
capabilities that can be characteristic for specific animals.28 Although characteristics can differ 
between members of the same species, species-membership cannot be said to be irrelevant. Only 
in the community of your own species you can flourish; a human cannot flourish as a 
chimpanzee, and vice versa. This too, one can argue, can be explained as a capability to flourish. 
Concluding, Nussbaum says that species-membership is important for judging which capabilities 
should be protected for being to be able to flourish, whereas differing capabilities or defects can 
give rise to obligations of special care to ensure the development of the animal – human or 
nonhuman. 
 
In defense of the Capabilities Approach  
After this extensive summary of the Capabilities Approach, one may ask what the 
importance is of this theory. In light of a good defense and development of my own version of 
this argument, I will also use some other scholars who have drawn upon the Capabilities 
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Approach to defend their position. In the next section, I will review the Capabilities Approach as 
endorsed and criticized by other theorists. It must be clear that there are several versions, and 
this is in no way an unimportant or underdeveloped strategy to argue for justice. 
The Capabilities Approach is developed by the scholar Amartya Sen. Sen evolved his theory 
about the assumption that what makes a life valuable, is not what people can consume. It is the 
available standard of living, which falls back on what we are able to do. It is our functioning that 
establishes our welfare.29 Martha Nussbaum, as we have seen, has modified the theory by 
making a list of capabilities that we should defend. Our political decisions must be aimed at 
defending these capabilities and ensure that people, as well as animals, will have the opportunity 
to use them.30 This is her idea of a just society. 
When Sen developed his Capabilities Theory, he was mainly concerned with the way our 
individual freedoms are correlated and sometimes work in opposite directions. His book is 
meant to give us a new idea of how politics, economics and social constructions should work 
together. Individuals should be seen as the changers of society, and not just the recipients of 
whatever is given and stable.31 Sen aims at achieving another way of focusing on development; 
he wants to inspire public discussion by presenting his work for a broad public and welcoming 
criticism and skepticism. But, he has a clear message for the reader: we must change the way we 
look at progress and development. 
Development, Sen asserts, must be focused at expanding freedom. We must not concern 
ourselves with the concepts that economists tend to look at, such as GNP or economic growth, 
but we should aim at enhancing peopleǯs freedoms. In this way we will focus on what is 
important for people, rather than letting the economical means to this goal blind us.32 
Unfreedom is the result of poor economic circumstances. Thus, we should develop these 
circumstances, but not because we value economics, but because we value their outcome: more 
freedom. Sen claims that these are not the same. For example, people who earn more do not 
necessarily have a longer life-expectation than people with lower income.33 Also, a market 
system can work restrictive for parties that want to enter the market, but on the other side we 
must not forget the big benefits such a market system can produce.34 Eventually, a political 
system that cherishes human capabilities and substantive freedoms should increase differing 
instrumental freedoms. Sen talks about five: political freedoms, economic facilities, social 
opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security.35 According to Sen, he will show 
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that these instrumental freedoms link to each other and to the importance of valuing human 
freedom in general. We must keep in mind that this empirical link to each other is crucial in 
understanding that, as well as the end of development, instrumental freedoms are also the 
means towards this development.36 
Sen sees that a lot of inequality in the world has to do with unfreedom. He mentions famine, 
which leads to the unfreedom to survive, or inequalities between men and women, that 
undermine certain basic freedoms that women should have.37 There are two main causes of a 
lack of freedom. The first is inadequate processes; Sen notes that in a democracy, famine is not 
likely to occur.38 The second is inadequate opportunities for citizens, such as basic opportunities 
to escape premature mortality. Senǯs theory, which focuses on enhancing freedom and individual 
capabilities, wants to deal with both issues. In his theory, freedom and capabilities go hand in 
hand; to increase freedom is to make sure that people have the capabilities to lead the kind of 
life they value, and have reason to value. Focusing on capabilities gives us a clearer view of the 
real causes that lead to unfreedom. Sen argues, for example, that unemployment not only causes 
low income, but also leads to unfreedom in the sense of skill development and initiative. Sen also 
states that functioning is not always correlated to means.39 A disabled person is not able to do 
the same as a normal abled person, while they can have the same economically relevant 
properties. When we focus on capabilities rather than economic faculties, we will discover that 
such issues of actual functioning are far more problematic than we first acknowledged.40 
What is notable in Senǯs theory, is that it differs from Nussbaumǯs theory in one – for me – 
very important aspect. Nussbaum, as we have seen, focuses on capabilities we have as a human 
being or as an animal, and maintains that we should aim to protect these capabilities. With Sen, 
capabilities are presented as a set of options, of different life paths we can take. When Sen talks 
about optimizing capabilities, he means that in a way that links specifically to freedom; you have 
to be capable in a sense that you can choose the life that you value.41 With Nussbaum, a capability 
can be there, in the actor, but the actor is unable to use it. With Sen, the actual inability to do as 
you wish is proof that you do not have a capability to act.42 Both authors thus stress the 
importance of capabilities, but Nussbaum tries to enforce them, while Sen tries to create them. 
With capabilities as a foundation of rights, I have to presume that some capabilities are present, 
                                                          
36
 In the same way in my theory, capabilities are a means to rights as well as the end which rights are created 
for. 
37
 Sen, Development as Freedom. p. 15.  
38
 Ibid. p. 16-17. Famine does not occur in democracies as often as in other political systems, because leaders in 
democracies can be held accountable for their actions. 
39
 SeŶ, ͞HuŵaŶ Rights aŶd Capaďilities.͟ p. 154. 
40
 Sen, Development as Freedom. p. 20-21. 
41
 Ibid. p. 75. 
42
 See also: CƌoĐkeƌ, ͞I - Functioning and Capability - the FouŶdatioŶs of SeŶ͛s aŶd Nussďauŵ͛s DeǀelopŵeŶt 
EthiĐ.͟ p. ϱϵϵ, foƌ the diffeƌeŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ SeŶ͛s aŶd Nussďauŵ͛s Đapaďilities. 
Nussďauŵ͛s Capaďilities Approach and Animal Rights 
 
18 
 
even when they are not visible. If I would not do that, I would not have a foundation to grant  
someone a right whose capabilities are interfered with by someone else. 
 
 
 
The Neutrality and Arbitrariness of the Capabilities Approach 
Eric Nelson is one of the scholars who replied on the Capabilities Approach. He mainly 
criticizes the list Nussbaum provides, for a number of different reasons. Nelson captures 
Nussbaumǯs theory as trying to provide a Rawlsian account of justice and the good life, meaning 
that it does not dictate a particular way of living. Rather, it defends the different life paths people 
may want to choose, and the capabilities that Nussbaum specifies in her theory would be 
important for everyone and every life path. Nelson argues that he does not think everything on 
the list of Nussbaumǯs capabilities actually counts as a capability. The capability to have shelter, 
for example, seems more like a basic need than an actual capability. Having shelter can be a 
prerequisite for properly acting on other capabilities, but Nelson holds that it is not a capability 
in itself.43 He also contests Nussbaumǯs supposition that shelter can be a state of being, and 
therefore can be a capability.  
Moreover, Nelson criticizes Nussbaum because she claims that her list of capabilities are not 
ordered; she argues that they are all equally important. Nelson says that this is not in order with 
the way she describes these different capabilities. Some she says are fundamental for human 
functioning, and it would be terrible to delete them from the list. Others she mentions are more 
open for discussion or modification.44 Nelson questions this distinction, and he seems to have a 
good reason for it. Why would we judge the quality of some capabilities according to equality 
(like bodily integrity), and others on some basic threshold (shelter)? 
In his discussion about the neutrality of Nussbaumǯs list, Nelsonǯs argument ends in that he 
thinks a list of capabilities that everyone would want in any circumstance would be impossible 
to make.45 Making such a list is in contrast with the Ǯstate neutralityǯ principle of Rawls. If we 
make any capability more important than another, and we dictate to people what they should 
find important, we cannot ever be neutral. I think that this argument is not solid. I agree that we 
should question the neutrality of Nussbaumǯs argument; we cannot know if all her capabilities 
are important for everyone, and some would be rejected by certain societies. But I do think that 
it is possible to point to certain freedoms that every species should have without treating them 
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unequally. Goods should not always be provided by the state, but freedom should. Nelson makes 
it look like providing freedoms can be the same as giving a dollar to someone who wants to buy 
a pizza, and someone who wants to buy a Bentley; it would be irrational to give more to the 
person who demands more. But freedom is not an interchangeable good with absolute value; it 
is an end, where goods such as Bentleys can only be a means to.46 Freedom is allowing people to 
choose, and only restraining them when necessary. A better example would be for two kids; one 
demands playing in the yard, another wants to jump off a plane. In this situation, it is obvious 
that we do not give equal freedom to each, while we do not treat them unfairly.  
Moreover, if a state refrains from including important freedoms in its laws, we must 
conclude that is actually does the opposite; it promotes unfreedom. Nelson argues that if a state 
promotes the freedom of people to enjoy sex, it can be referred to as non-neutral to people who 
believe sex is sinful. If we take this seriously, and the state would not promote freedom of sex 
because it may seem non-neutral, the state would in fact tell their constituents that their choice 
is not important. It is a (small) group of people that judges their choice as sinful and dictates the 
law. Promoting freedom of choice is something else; it tells people that, whatever they think, 
they are free to be and do what they want. It does not mean this state has a conception of ǲthe 
goodǳ; it means, on the contrary, that people are free to choose what is good, which is exactly the 
objective of the Capabilities Approach. 
The real worry here is what happens if two capabilities conflict. Although it is hard to 
answer the kinds of questions in general, it must be mentioned here. We could think of 
situations in which the state would promote freedom of choice, but this freedom would coincide 
with capabilities. People may choose goods that would prevent them from functioning fully or 
flourishing. How would we handle such a case? 
Nussbaum acknowledges that her theory is not founded on a strong procedural foundation. 
But that is also the strong part of her theory; what matters in life is not a single quality, but a 
plural set of capabilities.47 Her theory is an outcome-based one, meaning that it will base its 
preferred outcome on an intuitive idea about justice. According to Nussbaum, if there are two 
capabilities that clash, this means that society is not well-designed. The questions we ask 
ourselves when deciding between different capabilities will help us with better construing 
society so as these inconsistencies do not occur.48 Hence, in the above example we should think 
about the intuitive best outcome, and shape our judgement correspondingly. I confess that this 
answer is not the most satisfying, but it likely is the best we can ask from the theory, since the 
basis of the theory is purely intuitive and outcome-based.  
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David Crocker also attempts to summarize and reflect on the Capabilities Approach. His 
focus is on the comparison between Rawls on the one hand and Sen and Nussbaum on the other. 
He acknowledges the previous discussion and elaborates on it further. In his view, both the 
theories from Rawls and Sen are non-neutral, because they rule out certain other views. Crocker 
says that Senǯs theory is more determinate, because he rules out certain non-authoritarian views 
too, whereas Rawls only rules out authoritarian views that would force certain principles upon 
citizens.49 Sen demands more from states, because he would also urge the state to protect 
positive liberties, not only negative ones. He himself does not argue for a comprehensive 
doctrine with predetermined values, but he would argue that we can reach the conclusion that 
certain doctrines are just not enough to protect the freedoms of citizens. 
Nussbaum tackles Rawls in a different way. Where Sen tries to show their doctrines are 
both neutral, but his must be more extensive because Rawls fails to be neutral regarding anyone, 
Nussbaumǯs strategy is to argue that Rawls is not neutral to begin with. His belief is also inspired 
by an idea about the functioning of people.50 He cannot, in Nussbaumǯs view, make his argument 
without first admitting that he values human capabilities. Crocker argues this is due to how 
Nussbaum and Sen both see capabilities. As I mentioned, Nussbaum regards a capability as a 
power to act, where Sen views a capability as a possibility. With Senǯs emphasis on the freedom 
of choice that people should have, it is clear why he would be more inclined to argue that his 
theory is neutral. Nussbaum seems to think of neutrality as a more uncomplicated issue. She 
would argue that her theory is neutral to all affected by it, but probably would not say the 
doctrine is completely neutral, because she clearly incorporates faculties that she thinks 
important for human – and animal – dignity, such as freedom. 
Neutrality or objectivity remains the most important problem scholars encounter with the 
capabilities theories. Christopher Morgan Jonhson, in his book about Nussbaumǯs theory and his 
objections to it, argues that there are certain unavoidable problems with Nussbaumǯs theory. 
Although she sidesteps the problems she sees with Senǯs theory, her values raise a problem for 
her own.51 Nussbaum claims that people should agree upon her capabilities, but their reason for 
agreeing does not have to be the same. In this way she does not force convictions upon people; 
her theory provides citizens with valuable capabilities while maintaining their right to choose 
their own way of life.52 Johnson is not so sure that she accomplished this. The main part of his 
book is devoted to finding out if Nussbaumǯs assertions are politically liberal, as she argues, or 
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are rather more a comprehensive liberal doctrine, already prescribing particular values.53. 
Johnson also involves Rawls when he explores what his problem is exactly. According to 
Johnson, Rawls defends his philosophy that justice as fairness is the theory that does the most in 
terms of equality and is the best liberal justice system, but he acknowledges the legitimacy of 
other political liberal theories. This is where Nussbaum disagrees; she agrees with Rawls 
principle that equal liberty is of main importance in a system of justice, but asserts that we need 
more from states than Rawls argues. 
Nussbaumǯs list is about the choices you should have as a citizen and does not force 
anybody to follow a way of life they do not endorse.  This is, in her opinion, what sets it apart 
from comprehensive liberal doctrines, that impose their values upon their constituents.54 But 
Nussbaum argues for an overlapping consensus that goes much beyond only political ideas. In 
her view, the state must intervene in every social construction whenever it can be better shaped 
according to justice and equality.55 The question to be asked is whether her theory is still only a 
political one, when clearly the state may intervene in every field it finds itself necessary. 
Nussbaum is also more demanding in her assertion that every citizen will in time admit to her 
capabilities list, whereas Rawls argues his moral values are already closely related to the 
convictions people already have. Nussbaum expects a major shift in moral sentiments and 
requires, apart from mutual understanding and acceptance, that people constantly look out for 
each otherǯs dignity.56  
Johnsonǯs overall argument is that Nussbaum is disrespectful to citizens who do not already 
endorse her principles.57 Though for some people the acceptance of the capabilities will come 
without many problems, for others it will be very difficult to uphold these values. Nussbaum 
believes that she touches core qualities of human-beings that everyone enjoys. Therefore she 
argues that, no matter the cultural distinctions, reasonable citizens will always be able in time to 
comply with her capabilities.58 
I find these points compelling and will admit that we cannot call Nussbaumǯs theory neutral. 
Although the objection is legitimate, I do not think it has to be a difficulty. What needs to be 
proven is that the theory is plausible enough that we can take the risk of invoking on some 
peopleǯs beliefs first. I think the theory has shown to be adequately accepting of most ways of life 
that can be chosen by reasonable people and there are not many who will object to people 
having the choice to enjoy their capabilities. While it may be true that the people who do not 
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agree with it will be overlooked at first, the theory still gives plenty of room for these people to 
live the way they want to. Only when they restrain other peopleǯs capabilities they will be 
interfered with.  
 
 
 
Other Evaluations About the Capabilities Approach 
We have put a lot of effort in the debate about neutrality. This was necessary, but I would 
like to focus also on some other, smaller objections. In his book, Johnson states some other 
features about the capabilities theories which he questions too. He cites other authors but also 
contributes with his own view about how the Capabilities Approach lacks argumentative power, 
or where Senǯs and Nussbaumǯs theories differ from each other. He points to the quite obvious 
problem, that I have not discussed yet: capabilities are hard to measure, while the rules of justice 
should be easy to obtain for citizens.59 In a state where justice is served, people should be able to 
know when they have not been treated according to just principles. It will be too hard for 
citizens to estimate whether their capabilities have been infringed on or not. While this 
objection is reasonable when we talk about only humans, it will not concern me here. Assuming 
that animals have no capability to even know what justice is, they will never be able to know 
when their rights are being violated. Respecting animals is of main concern, but humans will 
remain the sole defenders of their justice. If one would still argue that also for human-beings, 
which in the animal case are the safe keepers for justice, should be able to know whether justice 
is served, Johnson provides me with the answer. Although the question seems legitimate, we 
cannot hold off a theory of justice because we think it will be too hard to pursue.60 If all other 
arguments for the Capabilities Approach turn out to be solid, it would be odd to discard it based 
on the difficulty of the theory. Johnson goes into more detail about how capabilities theorists say 
we could measure capabilities. Without mentioning every possibility, I will note that 
measurement of unknown capabilities is also a known concern of mine. Imagination, research 
and intuition should help us with this difficulty. 
In his next chapter, Johnson encounters a problem that I have not paid attention to yet, but 
is a distinction between Sen and Nussbaum that should be mentioned. Sen, as we have seen, 
thinks constituents of a country should be able to decide for themselves which capabilities they 
want to pursue. One of the problems Nussbaum finds with that tactic is that people could adjust 
their preferences to what they think they deserve or can accomplish. This could lead to lower 
expectations and actual injustice, because people in different situations will value things more or 
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less important. For instance, a homeless man will have other aspirations than someone who has 
grown up in a wealthy environment.61 Her list with capabilities is thus important because it 
establishes for all people what their standard of life should be. Preferences adjusted to, for 
example, differing social situations, will be tested against Nussbaumǯs evaluative norms. In this 
way, she tries to ensure that social structures or the biases of a country will not establish the 
preferences people have and what they aspire to.62 Thus, although she values the legitimacy of 
the state or individuals to choose which capabilities they want to enforce, Nussbaumǯs list is a 
guideline which also can be an incentive to better policies. Sen relies too much on political 
concepts, such as engagement of citizens and proper discussion, that he seems not to be realistic 
about the power structures within a country and how policies are chosen and implemented.63 
Finally, as one scholar, Streeten, noted, Senǯs capabilities cannot be measured by their net 
outcome.64 The value of the life one leads is decided by looking at the options one had to lead 
this life, and if the path one leads is actually chosen or just an outcome of the freedoms and 
capability one had. According to Streeten, we could ask whether it is a better idea to distinguish 
freedom of choice here, rather than calling freedom of choice and achievement together Ǯcapabilityǯ. But by doing that, we would miss the point Sen tries to make. Streeten wants to keep 
measuring poverty in achieved accomplishments, and judge the freedom of choice separately. He 
neglects that these are not separate matters; if one chooses not to eat because of religious 
reasons, one is not poor. Streeten does not develop his assertion here, so we cannot know for 
sure what he meant by this short claim, but it seems foolish to overlook the interlocking Sen calls 
out in his book. 
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Chapter Two: Developing the Capabilities Approach  
 
Capabilities and Rights  
In the development of the Applies Capabilities Approach, I will here address the concepts of 
rights and justice. My theory will be that capabilities give a solid basis to attribute rights. To 
support my claim, I will now discuss how we began to create rights, according to some scholars. 
Why did we need justice and how do we decide who gets which right? I will show that my theory 
is very close to the way natural rights theorists thought about the creation of rights, and how we 
can expand this logic to animals. 
As Regan points out, legal rights are always subject to change1. Over the years, they seem to 
get more inclusive than exclusive, giving women and people of different races more 
opportunities than they had before. My theory will state that animals too need more basic rights. 
The supposition itself is clear; animals share certain valuable capabilities with human-beings. 
When we focus more on these individual capabilities and less on the species than one is part of, 
we are free to re-examine the rights that we want to attribute to animals and humans alike. But 
capabilities do not directly lead to rights. Being able to do something does not mean to have a 
right to something. This, I will discuss too. 
We have already seen some ways philosophers have argued for basic human rights. Rawls, 
as you may recall, claims that these would be what people would find acceptable to agree on.2 
His assumption is that everyone would choose the same rights, given the same, fair 
circumstances.3 This means that Rawlsǯ conception of rights is mostly based on what he thinks 
reasonable people would agree on. Rawls builds partly on older, more basic theories about 
justice and the state. As he mentions himself, he wants to rely on these assumptions, and create a 
theory on a higher level of the known social contract theories.4 It is not unwise then to seek for 
the base of rights in these theories. I will begin with discussing Locke and Hume as natural rights 
theorists. Then I will work my way through the conception of a right with more contemporary 
philosophers. Ending this first part of the chapter, I will talk about rights related to animals, and 
the most important animals rights theorists. My main question in this part of my thesis will be 
the following: How do we go from capabilities to rights, and how does this help us towards a 
better justice system including animals? 
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Natural Theory and Convictions 
Locke was a classical liberal and one of the first authors who established a doctrine which 
inhabited natural rights and freedom. His views about how the state should function and protect 
its constituents are about as little interference as is needed. Only to protect the public good or 
the possessions of the people, the state can intervene.5 And in a State of Nature, which is the 
state people are in without government of laws, we are only ruled by reason, which prevents us 
from harming each other.6 Though, it seemed that reason is not enough basis to trust each other. 
Men will join together in a community to protect themselves against each other, and they will do 
that by giving their mutual consent.7 We have already seen that this consent is a problem in the 
case of animals. What must be noticed is why men are driven to form a community with each 
other. According to Locke, we can punish the people who want to do us harm, but it would be 
impractical for everyone to be their own judge and executioner. Human passions could take 
punishment too far.8 Still, we want to be able to protect ourselves. The protection thus will be 
the job of the state, and in the uncertain circumstances of the State of Nature man will quickly 
begin to establish such a state.9 However, the contractarian theory only allows reasonable 
people to join a society. But not only reasonable people can be harmed by the people that act on 
their own ill passions. So why do only reasonable people have the opportunity to join a society 
and protect themselves?  
David Hume examines human behavior and moral code by studying our natural and 
artificial beliefs. Hume thinks that justice is one of the artifacts that we created between humans 
because only humans use it. We judge people by the actions they take and judge them for their 
motives to act.10 Hume argues that in the end, we cannot believe that justice comes natural to us. 
That is because, although we may agree on which acts are virtuous or not, we cannot find a 
sound reason for what we should think without relying on existing just structures, such as 
societies.11 So we learn in our interactions with each other which acts are just and how we 
should judge them. Justice, thus, is also in Humeǯs perspective mainly intuitive.12 
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Hume notes that, although our sense of justice is artificial, he does not mean that virtuous 
motives cannot be Ǯnaturalǯ in the sense that they are most basic to the human functioning. In 
this respect, animals too possess natural instincts of what is just. Different studies have 
suggested that animals have a conception of what is good, or can at least show complex 
emotions that hint towards compassionate and virtuous behavior. Rhesus monkeys have shown 
an example of this. In an experiment where the monkeys had to shock another monkey in order 
to get food, the surplus of the monkeys would choose to starve rather than to harm their fellow 
beings.13 So this animal case supports Humeǯs assertion that animals can feel compassion, which 
he makes in another part of his book, and his idea that we can make a natural distinction in 
virtuous acts.14 
While the first sense of common interests is created by the human nature, rights and 
property too are not given or fixed. They are created by the passions of humans. Humans want 
ownership, and will not be restrained by some benevolent quality. Their wants for possessions 
will be restrained by just that; in order to be secure in ownership, humans must create 
recognition of possession of others.15 Justice is then also driven by passions. Hume maintains the 
following: 
 
Here then is a proposition, which, I think may be regarded as certain, that ’tis only from 
the selﬁshness and conﬁn’d generosity of man, along with the scanty provision nature has 
made for his wants, that justice derives its origin.16 
 
Hume furthermore makes an important remark. He claims that, because society derives 
from our different passions and interests, and because every man is here concerned with 
himself, a conception of society is never natural. Man would not constrain each other in such a 
way if brotherhood came natural to us.17 Thus, the passions that drive us into creating the rules 
of justice are certainly natural and human, but the concept of justice itself remains a human 
construct to preserve society and make sure everyoneǯs possessions are safe. 
What makes this such an important remark is that justice is clearly human. While the 
passions Hume describes are certainly also present in animals, they have not established justice 
among them. They stay forever in superficial societies with each other, relying on each other 
when needed in mutual agreement, but fighting each other when that is the necessary action. 
Brotherhood and cooperation, which does not come naturally to humans, does to animals. Some 
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would say that this means that justice and rights are only applicable to humans, but I would 
argue against that. The fact that human beings created justice is because their passions stand in 
the way. Their need for possession, even if it is not necessary for survival, drives them towards 
securing their own possessions from other people. It is exactly these passions that animals must 
be protected from.  
We can establish this too by looking at evidence from animals studies. Mary Midgley has 
claimed that human-beings are far more ǲbeastlyǳ than other animals. We have used the word 
beastly to describe dangerous animals, while in fact humans are the most dangerous creatures of 
all. When not provoked or hungry, animals are not likely to attack. Conversely, humans attack for 
very different reasons, from being unreasonably anxious to ǲjust for funǳ.18 It is very 
understandable then why the act of justice only applies to human-beings, since they are the only 
beings who need this justice because of their brutish passions, and why other animals should be 
protected from these passions too. The differences between humans and animals that have 
always been used to indicate that justice is only applicable to humans, now seems to show 
justice must be broadened to apply to at least some animals.19 Animals should participate in 
justice, but only as recipients. As John Plamenatz notes: rights can only be rights against rational 
beings.20 
Still, many theorists would hold that animal cannot be recipients of rights or be part of a 
society because they lack the specific qualities that are required for that. Despite I think that this 
objection might in essence prove to be unsuccessful against the arguments for animals being 
able to have rights, I want to pay some attention to the discussion due to its importance as a 
main criticism. The most common argument of this nature is that animals lack moral agency and 
cannot contribute to society, making them unfit for rights-bearing. Philosophers like Thomas 
Aquinas and Descartes have questioned animal agency to defend their distinguished nature from 
humans.21 But also more contemporary philosophers have made this argument. One example is 
Tibor Machan, who holds that human-beings are the only species who are in need of moral Ǯspaceǯ.22  But this argument is flawed for an important reason, which has already been brought 
forward shortly: in this line of argument, a lot of humans would be excluded too. 
This argument is commonly named the argument of Ǯmarginal casesǯ. Robert Garner, for 
example, has written about this subject in combination with a defense of animal rights. The 
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argument goes like this: if we assert that there are human-beings who have the same or less 
mental capacities as animals but still are members to the moral society, consistency demands 
that we should make animals members of this moral society too.23 Even though this argument 
seems strong, it has not yet succeeded in changing the way we treat animals. The problem here 
is probably that it does not only challenge the way in which we treat animals, but also the way in 
which we handle our elderly or mentally disabled people.24 This argument defeats the moral 
agency objection, and paves the way for a more plausible theory of rights that includes animals 
as well as marginal humans. 
 
From Animal Capabilities to Animal Rights 
The previous section considered the reasons for joining in a society. I have shown that, 
although not every being has the rational capacity to enter a society, that does not mean that 
they should not be allowed to join. In this part, I will bring forward some authors who have 
claimed that animals, just like human-beings, have rights that we have to protect. I will 
demonstrate that these arguments are about singular animal capabilities, which are being 
translated into rights. Similar capabilities are the most important method of measurement that 
animal welfare theorists have used to make a case for animal rights. I will try to explain this 
transition in light of what we have already spoken about, thereby denying also some critical 
reviews. 
One might object to my theory that I can assume that there is a basis on which we can 
attribute rights according to capabilities, but I cannot yet prove that having a capability 
automatically means one has a right. I would agree, and I will now shortly defend why this 
connection is present. 
Paul Ricoeur has made this transition rather convincingly in a piece which was printed in a 
recent book about capabilities.25 He has a slightly different view of what capabilities are, 
claiming that a capability is self-recognition of something which you caused. The transition from 
capabilities to rights then can be viewed, according to him, as the transition from self-
recognition to recognition of the causality of others.26 Here Ricoeur means distinguishing as 
recognition, meaning to recognize something as the one, and not the other.27 One would have a 
need for a right when one has a need for mutual recognition, which gives a sense of fulfillment 
and satisfaction. With mutual recognition of capabilities, there come more opportunities to 
develop these capabilities, which in term leads to claims to more rights. Where one is able to 
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influence and recognize that someone else is able to influence as well, and they recognize each 
otherǯs desire to be recognized, they will grant each other the right to express their capabilities. 
Robert Savage has written an essay about the connection between Ricoeurǯs recognition of 
capabilities and Nussbaumǯs work concerning enhanced rights for underprivileged groups. He 
too emphasizes the correlation between the treatment of people who are less well-off, and the 
unjust restriction of their capabilities.28 The great injustices done to human beings encompass 
the inability of these humans to act on their capabilities. Here we see a clear connection to Senǯs 
theory.29 Sen, Ricoeur and Nussbaum seem to agree on a correlation between injustice and 
incapability; failing to recognize someoneǯs being human and enabling some less than others is 
fair or just. The opposite will be beneficial on the same, multiple accounts: give someone an 
opportunity to work, and his ability to take care of himself will also encourage him to do other 
things he never had the means to. 
This theory has a strong similarity with the natural rights theories I have used in the 
previous sector. Mutual agreement leads to the development of the state. But, where the natural 
rights theorists focus on a need for protection and ill passions which would destroy possession, 
Ricoeur explains the need for rights in terms of capabilities. He states that not being able to act 
on capabilities is what leads to frustration and – especially – contempt. When capabilities are not 
recognized, the underdeveloped or underprivileged will not feel like capable beings.30 These 
people will not be able to flourish like they should be able to. Conversely, with mutual 
recognition and cooperation, people will enhance each otherǯs capabilities. When a person feels 
capable, this person will develop himself more and contribute more to the world, and from this 
contribution other people will in turn profit. It is thus in the interest of all to ensure recognition 
and stimulation of capabilities. As Savage puts it: 
 
The harm done to the confidence in oneǯs own capacities consequently redoubles the 
harm inflicted by the power that an individual or a group exercises over another. 
Intimidation, coercion, and manipulation thus figure among the forms of violence 
intrinsic to those instrumental strategies that enforce and maintain asymmetrical 
cultural, economic, social, and political relations. 
 
Kymlicka and Donaldson also contribute to this discussion. According to them, we need to 
acknowledge each other to admit to our mutual dependency to make use of our capacities.31 
Dependency in itself is not a problem, but the way in which we handle dependency is crucial. If 
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we do not recognize what people or animals are able to do themselves and enable them to act, 
we would cause harm to their dignity. In the case of domesticated animals, for example, we 
should look further than their current dependency on us. Instead, we should be concerned with 
their capability to be a functioning being as much as they can and take their preferences in 
consideration. 
Thus, from a just as well as a moral perspective, we should emphasize the importance of 
capabilities and ensure that they are protected by law. Capabilities are a primal source of 
functioning animals and people, and ensure that they are able to shape their own life-path. 
Dealing with animal rights in essence means enforcing their right to make their own choices in 
life. Although many will argue that capabilities are not the only source of justice, I would argue 
that everything else that is good in the world, is produced by capable beings. We cannot shape a 
justice system without the requirement of capable beings, which are the only example of 
dignified beings. Justice gives us reason to require a Capabilities Approach when implementing 
animal rights. 
 
The recognition of certain capabilities has been widely used in contemporary literature, and 
is definitely a starting point for animal rights theories. Albert Schweitzer asserts that the chief 
task for morality is knowing our own will to live and recognize this in others as well.32 Pain is 
pain, says Salt, when he addresses the question if animals can in fact have rights.33 Pain seems to 
be a very common theme when we look for recognizable human qualities in animals that would 
be a foundation for animal rights. Utilitarians use this concept very often, sometimes hidden in 
another notion like suffering or being conscious. 
In defending animal rights, Robert Regan claims that we should consider the consciousness 
of animals. Regan attacks the assertion of René Descartes, who stated that only human beings 
are conscious creatures.34 Regan disagrees and cites for example Darwin, claiming that there is 
survival value in consciousness, which is proven with human beings. With the evolutionary 
theory in mind, one cannot but imagine that there are other animals who are conscious of what 
they do and how they can better adapt their behavior.35 Regan builds his statement on his 
argument that animals too can have beliefs, desires and expectations. He defeats several other 
theorists and claims that, because he has proved there is no good reason to believe that animals 
do not have consciousness, we can only reasonably believe they have. The burden of proof now 
lies with the opposing camp to establish the opposite. 
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It is crucial here to show which arguments are being defeated by Regan. First he addresses 
R. G. Frey, who holds that animals cannot have desires because they cannot have beliefs, and 
they cannot have beliefs because only beings who have a language can have those.36 Regan fights 
this argument with his claim that this leads to nobody being able to believe anything. In order to 
be able to learn a language, one must be able to believe. A child, for example, has to be able to 
have a concept of a ball to learn what the word ǲballǳ means.37 Hence, a belief is prior to a 
language. Another theorist, Stephen Stich, provides another objection. He says that in so far that 
beliefs are psychological states, animals can have beliefs and desires. But in his opinion, those 
also have content, and we do not know what animals believe or desire. It is indeed hard to tell 
what animals believe, since we have to deduce it from their non-verbal communications.38 But 
Regan thinks we can know that animals do share some of the beliefs we have by observing how 
they behave. He shows the case of Fido the dog, who exhibits a clear case of being able to 
recognize a bone. His excitement of seeing a bone or his willingness to dig up a bone provides us 
with a clear case of recognition and a stable belief.39  
There are more ways in which scholars try to prove that, due to the similarity of animalsǯ 
capacities to peopleǯs, animals should be awarded certain rights. As I shortly mentioned already, 
one of the examples is the capacity to suffer. This particular characteristic is used most 
prominently by Utilitarians like Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill.40 According to Bentham, 
qualities like the number of fingers or the color of skin are of no significance. What matters is the 
question of suffering.41 Bentham claims that we should aim at happiness, as all Utilitarians. In his 
view, happiness is the absence of pain and suffering.42 Mill stands by him, arguing that for too 
long we have been too caught up with our existing ideas about brotherhood. It is time we 
recognize the mistakes we made by differentiating between man and woman, white and black 
people, are the same mistakes we make now by differentiating between animals.43 What is good 
about this theory is that Bentham deliberately correlates significant factors to each other. If the 
suffering is what is important in cases where harm is done, we should be concerned with all 
sentients, and not just humans. 
Conversely, there remain authors who do not agree with this kind of classification. They still 
hold that there is something significantly different about human-beings which gives us reason to 
defend humans more than animals. From ancient – and not so ancient – philosophers, we learn 
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that the original ideas are that animals exist for the sake of humans.44 In more recent writing 
there is for example Michael Fox, who disagrees with the notion that we need some kind of Ǯanimal liberationǯ.45 He focuses on the writings of Singer and aforementioned Regan, and asserts 
that it is curious that they think suffering is the only important quality that should be taken into 
account when we consider if a being has rights. Moreover, the fact that we can prove animals 
have interests, does not mean their interests count as much as humansǯ interests. Fox maintains 
that, although he agrees that we can be occupied with the fates of animals and try to make their 
life pleasurable, we cannot speak about ǲmoral rightsǳ regarding animals. What Fox does not 
seem to have though is a conception of what he thinks we can prove about animal rights. His 
only defense is that we should be critical towards the arguments Singer and Regan promote, 
because we cannot be sure that animal interests and human interests are of the same value. But 
he does not have an argument to refute that idea either. It does not seem compelling to maintain 
there is a difference between two things, when we cannot point to the exact difference. 
One of Foxǯs better arguments is when he attacks the idea that suffering is the right common 
denominator to decide whether a being has rights. As he correctly notes, there are people who 
suffer from a medical condition that does not allow them to feel pain, thereby removing the 
condition that holds us back from hurting this person. Still, we would not find it acceptable to 
harm this person.46 I would agree with this argument; it seems that more needs to be proven 
valuable when we want to prove that it is immoral to harm each other. On the other hand, Fox 
also states that we cannot just ignore that there are important differences between animals and 
humans. In his view, the burden of proof is not on the people who claim that animals are 
different from humans, since we can all basically agree that animals are in very many aspects 
very different from humans.47 In my opinion, it is true that humans and animals differ greatly, 
but the same can be said for animals amongst each other. The better theories thus do not only 
distinguish in their attribution of (moral) rights between humans and animals, but also between 
various kinds of animals. It is as clear that a dog differs from a human as that it differs from an 
eagle. We have to provide a justice system that deals with all the significant particularities. 
 
Developing the Alternative Capabilities Approach 
After the work I have done explaining the Capabilities Approach and gathering evidence to 
support these claims, I have now finally reached the heart of my argument. Some of the claims I 
will make will seem familiar, because I mentioned them before. It is now that I will join the 
pieces together in the Applied Capabilities Approach as a rights theory that I have developed. 
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My main theme is that I want a theory where we can unite the bases for treatment in the 
most equal and indifferent way. By that I mean that there are two things considered when we 
decide which rights we should attribute to whom. The first is the base of affection: what is 
happening to someone? How is someone affected? As an example, take suffering; someone 
suffers when he feels pain. This can be emotional pain, physical pain, but pain makes us believe 
that someone suffers. This may be the most obvious example, but we can think of multiple 
factors that affect beings, and also beings in different ways. In the same way, every right we have 
protects us from ways in which people can act against us. The most basic rights we have as 
humans are summarized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.48 These entail the right 
to freedom, the right to security, the right to not to be a slave, and a fair number of other rights. 
Those rights protect us from being affected in unjust ways. When considering who can be 
attributed which right, we must first ask ourselves how people are affected by the action that 
denies this right. So the question is: Which capabilities are affected? 
The second basis we consider when we talk about a right is who it affects. Think about 
voting. In contemporary society, the presence or absence of the ability to vote is very influential 
for people. But this works different for animals. They have no ability to vote because they do not 
have an ability to reason, so giving them a right to vote is useless.49 With every right in 
particular, we can think of a capability which would decide if someone is affected by the right or 
not. The right to freedom, for example, will be attributed to the ones who can have total 
autonomy in their lives without reasonable expectation they would hurt others or themselves 
with this freedom. This is why we would want the right to freedom for every human-being, but 
do not extend it fully to children. Children can have the freedom to choose which sport they 
want to perform, because they have the capability to know what they like and what not. But we 
do not want children to drive a car or make a financial plan. They need their full capacity of 
reason to know which decisions are to be made in these situations. This is also true for a right to 
abortion; only women would benefit from this right, since only women can get pregnant.50 When 
attributing a right, it is important to know if the recipient will benefit from this right. So the 
second question is: Who inhabits the capability that is affected? 
The same goes for animals. Animals have a capability to know what they want to do with 
their lives. If they are left alone in the wild, most of them would be able to survive, only 
restrained by their natural enemies. But when it comes to domestic animals, it is different. They 
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have been put in a society where they need protection, because they do not have the capability 
to know when to cross a road or how to gather food. So when we consider their corresponding 
capabilities with the right of freedom in this environment, we would not give animals full 
autonomy over their lives. 
The paths for animal rights that have been chosen before were focused on one particular 
issue, whereas I see there are many that should be considered. Utilitarians focus on the capacity 
to feel pain or pleasures. Singer chooses pain as one of his core concerns and argues that we 
have to assume that animals can feel pain. He rightly notes that it does not matter if someone can 
express the pain he feels in a linguistic way. If that were true, we would believe that a speechless 
human does not experience pain too.51 What other qualities do we need to judge whether we 
should or should not hurt a being, than that the being can suffer? And what other qualities do we 
need to establish whether someone should have the right to vote than that this being can 
reason? What other qualities do we need to judge whether a being has a right to his own life, 
other than the fact that the being has a life, and the capability to enjoy it, manage it himself, and 
lose it? How is not every right we have in principle based on some very distinguished 
capabilities we have as human-beings, and why do we not consider animal rights in the same 
way? 
We should establish a theory that takes every capability and corresponding right into 
account. Similarly, this theory should be able to conflate the two bases of rights. A theory that 
joins together the questions of what capabilities are protected by a right and who possesses 
these capabilities will be the goal. This is most effectively done by establishing which creature 
inhabits which capabilities, and focus on how these should be protected. Conclusively, the most 
just way to attribute rights is to combine them with capabilities. The best way to protect beings 
is also to protect their capabilities. 
I will now explain what my understanding of a right is to further elaborate on what actions 
should be taken to defend animal capabilities. There are a lot of different approaches to 
determining what a counts as a right or what we mean by a right. I have chosen to use a 
particular conception that is to be preferred for the purpose of my thesis. As I do not have 
further opportunity in this piece to explore all the options, I hope it will suffice that I make an 
argument for why I have chosen to use the concept of a right by Joseph Raz. 
Raz describes a right as follows:52  
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Definition: 'x has a right' if and only if x can have rights, and other things being 
equal, an aspect of x's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for 
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty 
The Principle of Capacity to have Rights: An individual is capable of having 
rights if and only if either his well-being is of ultimate value or he is an 
'artificial person' (e.g. a corporation). 
 
The simple explanation of why it is convenient for me to use this theory will probably be 
clear. Not only does Raz use a notion of a capability when he talks about a being that can have 
rights, he also asserts that wellbeing has to be taken into account. As wellbeing is a very broad 
demand, it can easily be translated to no pain, no freedom, etc. Raz himself does not think 
animals, such as dogs, are able to be bearers of rights.53 But he does not defend this view 
argumentatively. He only uses the example of an animal when he explains whose wellbeing is of 
ultimate value, and whose is not. As I have in length spoken about this subject and have claimed 
already that there is no reason to believe animals are different from humans in their values, I 
will not be concerned with his view on the matter. So when I talk about a right, it will be 
understood that I talk about the duties that others have to ensure wellbeing. In this thesis, that 
means the actions humans have to take to ensure the wellbeing of animals. 
 
The reason why I have chosen to focus on Nussbaumǯs theory rather than Senǯs, I have 
already given. I think Nussbaumǯs definition of capabilities is more like the definition I have in 
mind. Also, I do think we should establish some kind of list to ensure the protection of (animal) 
rights, unlike Sen.54 In the case of animal justice, we have to keep looking at different capabilities 
of varying species. According to their unique set of capabilities, we should understand what 
rights they need to flourish. My claim is that, although a fixed set of capabilities is hard to defend, 
there are certain rights and corresponding capabilities that are inviolable. We cannot take the 
risk that states interpret the list as they want, endangering animal justice. Although that would 
take a substantial amount of time, we have to reflect on our existing rights and why we endorse 
them, in order to expand them to the realm of animals. We should make a list according to the 
capabilities and corresponding rights and establish this connection in some sort of record. In 
this way, we can force states and other institutions to take the capabilities and corresponding 
rights seriously. Thus, I would argue for one list that is susceptible to change and modification. 
Moreover, would I endorse the conception that Sen argues for, I would place too much 
influence in the hands of people of the country that the animals live in. Sen would want a society 
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to decide, according to their public reasons, which rights they want to endorse.55 Only through 
public debate a society can be legitimately just and contributing to social progress, which would 
not be possible with a fixed list of capabilities.56 In the animal case, this would prove 
problematic. Animals have nothing to do with the culture or the preferences of the people who 
decide their fate. Deliberation about which rights should be inhabited for the sake of animals 
without strict guidelines would presumably, when we consider contemporary thoughts about 
animal rights, be often in their disadvantage. For the protection of animals, a universal standard 
is required, which is the connection between animal capabilities and rights and a list of these 
inviolable rights that stretches across the world.57 
 
Complications and moving forward 
I have laid out some ground principles about how we should inhabit capabilities into our 
understanding of rights. I will now more thoroughly defend the steps we would have to take to 
ensure that the right connections are made and what framework would prove to be the best to 
attribute rights.  
As I have defended, alongside Nussbaum, Singer, Regan and other theorists, a species-based 
argument is not valid. What we have learned from how we think about rights is that we created 
them to protect ourselves; we should protect every species that needs the same protection 
likewise. The first step we should take is to take a closer look to the existing rights we have and 
evaluate what it is these rights protect. The case is not always as straightforward as it seems. 
I have mentioned one of the objections that Fox has on Regan and Singer. Recall the man 
who has a medical condition and does not feel pain. We would still find it unjustifiable to harm 
this man. Clearly, our idea about harm does not only entail physical pain; we can recognize that 
being harmed, even when we do not feel any pain, is unjust and should be prevented. Another 
example is the case in which an unconscious person is raped. Maybe afterwards this person 
would not notice any effect at all. Still, the matter of being sexually assaulted while unconscious 
is unsettling. It is evident that in this case, we should focus on more capabilities than just being 
able to experience physical pain. It seems that the capability of bodily integrity would add a 
requirement to this case. If one has the capability of bodily integrity, we should respect that and 
not harm the body or interfere with this being without consent or the intention to help the being. 
Thus, when we consider to whom it may be important to have a right not be harmed, it would be 
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for beings who can suffer as well as beings who have bodily integrity, and probably more 
capabilities would come to mind if we further scrutinize the case of harming.  
Also an interesting case is that of a coma patient. If we have a patient who is proven to be 
unable for the rest of his life to do anything, but still is not dead, we would not consider this 
patient the same as a plant or a rock with no capabilities at all. We could think of a capability to 
live, which would guide as the baseline capability to guide our actions. As long as someone is 
capable to live, his interests should be taken into account. This means that, whatever capability 
may disappear, some rights would still have to be attributed. 
This example shows the method which should be followed when implementing rights. The 
theory requires lawmakers to look at individual capabilities. There are, of course, capabilities 
which are inhabited by animals and not by humans at all. It is more difficult to establish what an 
animal needs or what rights it should have when we cannot recognize the capability. Still, we can 
make an assumption about what that kind of capability is based on and how we can protect it 
against humans. It is, for example, evident that the capability to fly has a lot to do with a right to 
freedom and to move freely. When we deny a bird the right to move itself around in the way it is 
used to, we are hindering this bird in being what he wants to be or is supposed to be. We can 
imagine that not being able to fly would cause deep feelings of dissatisfaction and we can 
recognize the need to be free. When we allow the animals who transport themselves by foot to 
move freely, we should do the same for flying creatures. 
Still, this argument has a strong anthropocentric component which I have not yet defeated. 
If extended, this will prove that once we cannot imagine the importance of a capability, we are 
not bound to attribute rights accordingly. This for me is an uncomfortable outcome, but very 
challenging to counter. Since humans are the only creatures that create justice, the welfare of 
animals in relation to humans is solely in our hands. The fact that the creation of rights by 
humans is the only option, does not make it a justifiable option. How will we make sure, to the 
best of our capabilities, that animals are protected in a sufficient way? Is the theory not still too 
focused on humans? 
In her investigation about environmental issues and anthropocentrism, Onara OǯNeill claims 
that we can have a sufficient justice system based on human-beings as actors.58 She asserts that 
an anthropocentric theory is not in itself unjust. An anthropocentric theory can have humans as 
its main focus, without unfairly giving humans more than other non-human animals.59 
Speciesism is not an automatic component of an anthropocentric theory. In her view, an 
obligation-based theory has advantages over a rights-based theory, because we cannot take a 
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right as a moral basis, just the action that is required when we take that right seriously.60 Her 
theory is strong in argument; she too argues from the point of view that only humans can be 
understood as just or unjust creatures, and focusing on human obligations has the advantage of 
protecting everything which can be affected by humans.61 She admits that her theory will be 
unsatisfactory for animal rights advocates who would want to argue for actual animal rights 
instead of only human obligations, but still praises the tactic and claims that it has considerable 
merits.62 
I obviously do not agree with her whole theory. To me, it seems unavoidable that with the 
recognition of certain capabilities there come corresponding rights. OǯNeill also does not deny 
that, and only makes the case that for environmental rights theorists should focus on the ethical 
components of obligations instead of rights to make their arguments more justifiable. Still, her 
theory is important in that it is smart in distinguishing between the anthropocentrism of acting 
and of receiving. The worry might be that animal rights theories are solely based on human 
faculties, not acknowledging animal features. OǯNeill is effective in showing that an 
anthropocentric rights theory does not automatically discriminate against non-humans, because 
the basis of acting is not the same as receiving. When we regard not only humans as bearers of 
obligation-implying worth, the receiving end is diverse in species. Only the act-based end of the 
spectrum is solely focused on humans. As we have seen, this distinction is justified. 
In conclusion, we should not worry about falling short sometimes. I would like to refer back 
to the remark Johnson made: we cannot abolish the theory just because it will be hard for us to 
understand every important capability an animal has. We have to be aware of our responsibility 
and keep on evaluating our rights and the ones we ascribe to animals, thereby taking the 
obligations they take with them seriously. When we encounter difficulties, we should call on 
scientists and our imagination to help us explain animal behavior. This should make us more 
understanding towards the capabilities they inhabit and the rights that would accompany them. 
We should take on this responsibility, as the only possible actor of justice. 
 
I will now turn to the last complication that I want to address in my approach. This is the 
worry concerning the individuality that I argue for. Singer, for example, maintains that relying 
on individual characteristics would lead to discrimination too, only on another level.63 We could 
judge people based on their individual qualities and in that way judge people with a high IQ 
differently than someone with a lower IQ. Fortunately, I have proved that this will be only a 
problem where the basis of judgement is the same as the basis of the right. And in most cases, it 
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seems justified to judge an individual based on its individual capabilities. Whenever we treat 
someone with a lower IQ differently, it will only be because he has no capability to enjoy the 
right he is denied. However, one could still argue that we should let anyone participate in 
intelligence contests or let them apply for a selection procedure for a job if they want to. Denying 
them that based on a quality such as IQ seems to treat this person as a lesser human or already 
incapable. 
This example may seem more clear if we take an example of enjoying a sport, like baseball. 
Some people are too small to be a baseball player, or are simply no good at it. Will we stop these 
people from enjoying this sport? This is, in fact, a difficulty. However, a capability to enjoy 
something could be another reason to grant someone a right to do it. Whenever we find a 
situation in which the Capabilities Approach seems discriminatory, there will most likely be a 
capability which grants us room to attribute rights. And, in all situations, the capabilities in play 
must be weighed against each other and tested against the intuitive best outcome. In that way 
we ensure that a right will not be granted when that would be harmful or wrong.  
 
Capabilities and Animal Rights in Contemporary Society  
Nussbaum herself says that states should hold the capabilities as general goals. But, she also 
holds that state intervention is not necessarily permitted when a state fails to defend the 
capabilities.64 State intervention, according to her, is only permitted in certain very grave 
situations. Do I agree with her? I have already stated that I think we can force states towards 
better treatment of animals. In this last part of my thesis, I will explore certain consequences of 
my theory, as well as ways in which to deal with societal problems. I think the question of actual 
state intervention might be too soon to answer, but we can develop a guide towards 
incorporating animal rights. The question of how to deal with a Capabilities Approach and 
existing systems of justice is answerable, at least in a very foundational way. I will try to show 
that it is possible to think of methods to implement capabilities in a justice. 
I will consider some ground-breaking theories regarding animals in societies. One of the 
main theories that should be discussed is the work by Kymlicka and Donaldson, named Zoopolis. 
Their arguments about animal citizenship are intriguing at least and allow us to think more 
broadly about our options for including animals in our societies. However, I will show that my  
Applied Capabilities Approach is not in congruence with the kind of citizenship that is argued for 
in Zoopolis. I will defend another view of how animals should function among human beings and 
how we should regard them. This view is not at all complete, but it will give incentive to think 
about our relationship with animals in a different way. 
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I quoted Mary Midgley before, who made a claim about the bruteness of animals and 
humans. She correctly asks the question why reason is the only quality on which we judge 
human-beings. Humans have the most distinguished sexual lives, where they are not only driven 
by a passion to procreate, but also by pleasures. Also, they are not kind to their own species; 
unlike almost every other animal, humans are capable of killing someone from their own tribe 
out of passion.65 It is important here to notice that difference. What we want to do is create an 
environment where animals are safe from human passions, who have proved to be the most 
brute, unreasonable and dangerous. We humans have created a justice system to feel safe. It is 
time to do the same for animals. I can imagine that people would ask me how I would deal with 
animals amongst each other, but the answer is, I do not have to. I have shown the reason for the 
rights and justice system, and they are all human. The capability of humans to act in an unjust 
way is the reason that a justice system will regulate only human actions. For the animals do not 
know what just or unjust is, and will sometimes act wrongly, like the mentally disabled or a 
child, but never unjust. We would restrain them only in situations in which our intervention in 
necessary for the sake of justice, but never punish them or hold them accountable, like we do 
with reasonable humans. 
This is especially important when we look at the implications my account would have when 
we would enforce the capabilities animals possess. Certain animals would gain rights, for 
example rights to residence and a safe environment, which would require an amount of food or 
at least the opportunity to look for food, shelter and water. But there is a fair chance that these 
rights would somehow coincide with rights from other species, human or non-human. Consider 
for example a village who wants to build a road to the city, but discovers on the way that they 
would have to cross animal habitat and have to drain a river, because it is the only possible way 
to get to their destination. The city would be the only way for them to provide for themselves. 
How would we deal with these kind of problems? 
It would be very hard to distinguish between which rights and corresponding capabilities 
would be the most important in such cases. As I have said, it will be a long process of 
distinguishing capabilities for particular species, and this job may never be finished. Though, it 
seems fair to give some kind of direction. I want to remark firstly though that there is never a 
theory of rights which claims to know exactly what should be preferred in which situation. But 
in my case, we can still rely on the importance of the capabilities involved. This would mean that 
the village could build the road, if they would care for compensatory remedies, such as an 
artificial source of water somewhere else. Whenever there is only one option on each side, we 
could indicate how bad the capabilities would be hurt. A case of life and death always wins, as 
the capability to live is the fundamental capability that all capabilities rely on. 
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What about a case between animals? Consider the example of a domesticated dog stealing 
the catch of a fox. The dog does not need it for food, since we can reasonably assume that the dog 
gets his food from humans. But, the fox captured his catch, and must live off it. In this case, we 
would side with the fox, because he needs his food and he caught it. Another example might 
prove more difficult. In Britain, it has been proved that a virus that is being spread by the grey 
squirrels, which are not affected by it, kills red squirrels. Volunteers have gathered and shot 
hundreds of grey squirrels to protect the red from getting sick.66 How would we deal with that? 
This case is harder, because both species die. The ideal option would be to separate the 
squirrels, giving them each a space in which they can live in peace. But this would be tough to 
accomplish. We would think about sterilize the grey squirrel, so that it would decrease in 
population.  In the absence of a better alternative, we may have to rule for or against one of the 
squirrels. These kinds of cases need thorough investigation. What is clear, is that in a justice 
system based on capabilities, killing without investigation would be unacceptable. The merits of 
the capability approach here is that is required careful consideration, valuing and protecting the 
life of each animal before a decision is made. 
 
Most people would think that animal rights theory goes beyond concepts like states and 
citizenship. According to Lowe and Ginsberg, for example, it is generally accepted between 
animal rights theorists that they work within the scope of post-citizenship, where people act for 
other who are not part of their community.67 There is one work in particular that I want to 
discuss that is different. I quoted Kymlicka and Donaldson earlier when we talked about the 
relationship between capabilities and animal rights. The section I used there is where they 
consider domesticated animals. Kymlicka and Donaldson claim that domestication is part of the 
relationships between animals and humans. It is natural for certain animals to look for 
interaction with humans, or to live off the benefits that humans bring.68 According to them, the 
goal should not be to disentangle these connections, but to explore a healthy relationship that is 
beneficial for humans and animals alike. 
Kymlicka and Donaldson hold that animals can be divided in three different categories: 
domesticated, wild, and liminal.69 They are critical of Nussbaum, stating that she relies too much 
on the species-specific norm that a being should be able to thrive as how it is supposed to. 
Rather, Kymlicka and Donaldson would like a community to adapt to the socialization that has 
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already taken place between animals and humans, and take in account the individual capacities 
that beings can have.70 
Their disagreement with Nussbaum brings forth some familiar concerns. I would claim that 
individual capacities and needs would be defended, especially with the capability theory 
implemented in a theory of rights. The fact that an animal has a right to an own place, does not 
prevent the animal to choose human companionship. Moreover, Kymlicka and Donaldson seem 
to romanticize the concept of socialization. This process can come natural, but a lot of the 
human-animal relationships have been forced upon animals. A dog has no say in being adopted 
or not, a monkey has not consented to being chased away from its forest. It may well be that 
liminal animals have become adapted to and dependent of humans because humans have 
changed the environment in a way that they cannot be self-sustaining anymore. It seems 
dangerous to just accept the fact that animals and humans have socialized, while this 
socialization might have been another infringement upon animal rights. 
That being said, we do have to think about how to deal with the animals that are already 
domesticated. Kymlicka and Donaldson assert that we should grant domesticated animals some 
kind of citizenship. They think that animals can be agents in a society, participating and 
contributing alongside humans. Their theory comprises an understanding about how animals 
could coexist with humans in a community. They use arguments that come from the defense of 
people with disabilities, whose interests must also be supported.71 The main argument is that 
granted citizenship will allow us to look at individual needs of animals, take into account their 
interests, and not control their lives more than needed.72 There is a distinction between the 
treatment of people who pass by and citizens, and the way in which we should treat animals is 
more in congruence with citizen rights.73 
I have a few problems with this theory. The first one is that the logic seems reversed; 
animals would be granted rights because of their status as citizens, but not because of their 
status as animals. I value the distinction between the different kinds of animals and the 
appropriate actions we should take towards them. But where Kymlicka and Donaldson argue 
that domesticated animals should have more rights, also against other animals, I cannot agree. 
Extending their person-passing-by argument, this visitor has as much a right to protection as 
citizens, which Kymlicka and Donaldson would not agree to in the case of animals. Furthermore, 
rights linked to citizenship would mean that, outside the territory of the state, these rights would 
cease to exist. We need basic animal rights, alongside basic human rights, that keep them 
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protected also outside the scope of the state. We are just as responsible for the domesticated and 
dependent animal when he is from another country. 
Also, there are multiple theories about citizenship and the right to choose who you share a 
community with. It is not uncommon for scholars to defend the right of a state and its citizens to 
deny people access to their society.74 Kymlicka and Donaldson would have to deal with the fact 
that there is already a problem with the legality of forcing states to take in refugees, for example. 
They would have to show how their theory of animal citizens fits in with such widespread 
concern with granting citizenship. 
Although I think that Kymlicka and Donaldson are right in contrasting different types of 
animals, I argue that this distinction is better made with my Capabilities Approach as a basis for 
rights. It allows us to even further distinguish between what diverse needs animals have. Animal 
citizenship, in my opinion, stands in the way of treating animals as beings that have a right to 
flourish. The argument Kymlicka and Donaldson present for the enabling of wild animals seems 
much stronger to me. There they suggest that we let animals act upon their own sovereignty, but 
without denying these animals a right to protection or help when needed.75 Such treatment 
seems sensitive to their capability to take care of themselves, and their capability to live, which 
gives them a right to be helped when threatened by disasters, for example. This would be more 
in line with my Capabilities Approach and the level of consideration it demands. 
Nussbaum herself has another idea about domesticated animals that I would be inclined to 
agree with. She states that we should not consider domesticated animals as fully capable beings, 
because of the big dependency they have on humans. Nussbaum holds that a species-specific 
paternalism should be in place, that considers the interests of animals as well as treats them 
with the amount of guidance they need. 76 She contrasts her approach again with Utilitarianism. 
The possibilities that the Capabilities Approach creates is a good balance between caring for an 
animal as well as respecting his authority over his own life. Utilitarianism would be too narrow 
to take in account the plural, distinctive and not necessarily conscious preferences animals have. 
The appropriate way is thus not to grant animals citizenship, but to create a way in which 
animal rights are applied everywhere. This would mean that we establish something like the 
Universal Rights of Animals to regulate how states treat all their beings. When having such an 
account, we would be able to hold countries accountable if they act against the rights we specify 
in that treaty. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was developed right after the 
atrocities of World War Two, to prevent further situations in which these acts against humanity 
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could occur.77 In the same way, the way in which we exploit animals could be a direct reason for 
developing a similar testimony. A standard must be set for every country to handle their animal 
inhabitants, human and non-human alike. This standard must be linked to a recognition of 
capabilities. A global declaration of rights based on the capabilities in a being is the best way to 
guarantee that every being is dealt the rights that they should receive. 
Of course, this theory needs more specification. But it gives an idea of the path that we need 
to take to improve the condition of animals. The right path is not that which leads to animal 
citizenship, because this would hinder the method of the Capabilities Approach. We need a 
theory applicable to all animals, but not considering them as a whole. In the ideal situation, 
every individual being would obtain the rights based on their individual needs. In order to reach 
that situation, we should apply the Capabilities Approach. 
 
Conclusion 
As we have seen, one of the biggest concerns Nussbaum had with contractarian theories 
was that they are persistent in conflating the question of ǲWho frames the Principles of Justice?ǳ 
with ǲWhom are the Principles of Justice framed for?ǳ. I have shown in my discussion about 
natural rights theorists that these are clearly different questions. The wish to join a society 
comes from a feeling of unsafety that is caused by humans. Principles of justice are designed to 
protect against humans and should thus be concerned with just that: the protection against 
humans. My theory wishes to separate these two questions, attributing the responsibility to 
frame principles of justice to humans, while stressing the need to keep animalsǯ interests in 
mind. Animals, like humans, have something to lose. Capabilities are a source for development, 
for drive and flourishing, with the capability to live as the fundamental inalienable capability 
that every living creature exhibits. Animals need to be protected the way as humans are 
protected: by justice and the law.  
The Capabilities Approach itself focuses on the ways of life that people, as well as animals, 
can choose from. We have to focus on these capabilities because being capable in the fullest 
sense is what makes a dignified being. Recognizing each otherǯs capabilities strengthens the 
community and pushes development, not in an economical way, but in flourishing. Not being 
able to use capabilities can lead to negative feelings, such as frustration. On the other hand, being 
capable means being able to contribute and evolve. Hence, I have succeeded in my objective. I 
have shown that capabilities are valuable for all beings and are there are good reasons to extend 
the realm of justice to animals. Intuitively, it makes sense to link the capabilities to 
corresponding rights. It makes sense to attribute rights to the individuals that need these, 
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according to their capabilities. Capabilities are important in two ways: they are essential to the 
flourishing of a being and the only correct means to protect themselves in a justice system. 
However, a lot has to be determined. For a justice system to work, we must determine for 
every species what the capabilities are that should be defended, and what rights are to be 
implemented. It is probably impossible to ever have a perfect list of all capabilities and 
corresponding rights. Still, this should not hold us back in our effort to take down animal 
injustices. 
I have discussed that the theory is not completely neutral, placing great emphasis on 
freedom and choice. However, it aims at pleasing the most beings as possible by enabling the 
ones who choose a life path that do not deter others. Another probable complication is the 
choice we must make when different capabilities conflict. Nussbaum tells us that we should look 
at the just outcome, and according to that outcome calculate our just decision. This too will not 
always be easy. When exactly does someoneǯs freedom interfere with anotherǯs? And when do 
we intervene when someone is blocking his own capabilities? What matters more: his freedom 
to choose his own life path, or the importance of his capabilities? The implementation of just 
institutions will have to deal with these kinds of questions. But a further investigation into the 
tension between freedom and capabilities could be interesting. 
I have argued that I do not think the Capabilities Approach is compatible with animal 
citizenship, like Kymlicka and Donaldson argue for. I think the Capabilities Approach calls for 
more distinction than just dividing animals in three categories and attributing rights 
accordingly. The notion of citizenship is one that is created for people and I believe that only 
people can be the agents that citizenship requires. This does not mean that we ignore animal 
rights, but ideally, we would develop a global treaty that protects animals everywhere evenly 
The sceptic, who is not already convinced that animals can be right-bearers, may not have 
been convinced by my piece. I have not been able to attack the various arguments that scholars 
have against animals as right-bearers, although I have mentioned the most important objections. 
I have briefly shown that the argument of marginal cases defeats the assumption that animals 
cannot be recipients of justice. If we can grant rights to children, elderly or mentally disabled 
people, animals should not be any different. I have also defeated some objections made by Frey 
and Fox, in the beginning of Chapter Two. But the clearest defense of the worth of animals, 
according to my theory, is that it is not one quality that makes a life meaningful, but many. Most 
animal rights theorists base their theory on one quality that they think is most important in the 
theory of rights, and their attackers try to disprove this. But when we trade this all-or-nothing 
strategy for an approach that highlights different qualities and admits certain shortcomings of 
animals, while stressing some important other capabilities, we have a case that is more 
convincing and harder to disprove. Critics would have to demonstrate that capabilities are not 
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important at all when it comes to a theory of rights, while developing another approach that 
does not rule out any humans. That seems like an impossible task. 
Concluding, the essay leaves a number of questions open or vague. More research or more 
intuition and imagination should bring us closer to a complete doctrine of rights combined with 
capabilities. It is the best way in which we can protect the dignity of every being and treat them 
properly. For now, I have demonstrated my main ambition in confirming the connection 
between capabilities and rights. 
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